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Epistemological Realism and Onto-Relations
Abstract
The traditional concept of knowledge is a justified true belief. The bulk of contemporary epistemology has
focused primarily on that task of justification. Truth seems to be a quite obvious criterion—does the belief in
question correspond to reality? My contention is that the aspect of ontology is far too separated from
epistemology. This onto-relationship of between reality and beliefs require the epistemic method of
epistemological realism. This is not to diminish the task of justification. I will then discuss the role of inference
from the onto-relationships of free invention and discovery and whether it is best suited for a foundationalist
or coherentist model within a theistic context.
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THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF REALITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
God created both us and our world in such a way that there is a certain fit or 
match between the world and our cognitive faculties.  This is the adequation of the 
intellect to reality (adequation intellectus ad rem).  The main premise to adequation 
intellectus ad rem is that there is an onto-relationship between our cognitive or 
intellectual faculties and reality that enables us to know something about the 
world, God, and ourselves.1  This immanent rationality inherent to reality is not 
God but it does cry aloud for God if only because the immanent rationality in nature 
does not provide us with any explanation of itself.2 
In reality all entities are ontologically connected or interrelated in the field in 
which they are found.  If this is true then the relation is the most significant thing 
to know regarding an object.  Thus, to know entities as they actually are what they 
are in their relation “webs”.  Thomas Torrance termed this as onto-relations, which 
points more to the entity or reality, as it is what it is as a result of its constitutive 
relations.3 
The methodology of the epistemological realist concerns propositions of which 
are a posteriori, or “thinking after,” the objective disclosure of reality.  Thus, 
epistemology follows from ontology.  False thinking or methodology (particularly in 
scientific knowledge) has brought about a failure to recognize the intelligibility 
actually present in nature and the kinship in the human knowing capacity to the 
objective rationality to be known.4 
Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457) developed the interrogative (interrogatio) rather 
than the problematic (quaestio) form of inquiry.  Valla’s mode of inquiry was one in 
which questions yield results that are entirely new, giving rise to knowledge that 
cannot be derived by an inferential process from what was already known.  This 
method was similar to the works of Stoic lawyers and educators like Cicero and 
Quintilian; that is, questioning witnesses, investigating documents and states of 
affairs without any prior conception of what the truth might be.  Valla transitioned 
from not only using this method for historical knowledge but also applied it as “logic 
for scientific discovery.”5 
Valla’s logic for discovery was the art of finding out things rather than merely 
the art of drawing distinctions and connecting them together.  He called for an 
active inquiry (activa inquisitio).  John Calvin (1509-1564) applied this method to 
the interpretation of Scripture and thus became the father of modern biblical 
                                                 
1 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 269. 
2 John Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 106. Thomas Torrance, God and Rationality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), 93-94. 
3 Morrison, 106. 
4 Thomas Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 76-80. 
5 Thomas Torrance, “Einstein and Scientific Theology,” Religious Studies 8 no. 3 (1972): 236-
237. 
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exegesis and interpretation.6  Francis Bacon (1561-1626) applied it to the 
interpretation of the books of nature, as well as to the books of God, and became the 
father of modern empirical science.7 
This methodology created a split between subject and object, knowing and 
being, and gave rise to phenomenalism.  Newton claimed that he invented no 
hypotheses but deduced them from observations produced rationalistic positivism, 
which engulfed contemporary European thought.  This split’s gulf was widened by 
David Hume’s (1711-1776) criticism of causality and inference, depriving knowledge 
of any valid foundation in necessary connections obtaining between actual events 
and of leaving it with nothing more reliable than habits of mind rooted in 
association.8  Hume weighed heavy in Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) philosophical 
development.  Given the Newtonian understanding of space and time, Kant 
transferred absolute space and time from the divine sensorium to the mind of man 
(the transfer of the inertial system), thus intellect does not draw its laws out of 
nature but imposes its laws upon nature.  According to Kant one cannot know the 
Ding an Sich (thing itself) by pure reason; one is therefore limited to the sensual 
and shaping mental categories of the mind.  That which comes through sensation 
the intuitions are shaped by the mind’s a priori categories.  It is in this sense that 
Kant played an essential part in the development of the idea that man is himself 
the creator of the scientific world. 
Throughout Albert Einstein’s work, the mechanistic universe proved 
unsatisfactory.  This was made evident after the discovery of the electromagnetic 
field and the failure of Newtonian physics to account for it in mechanistic concepts.  
Then came the discovery of four-dimensional geometry and with it the realization 
that the geometrical structures of Newtonian physics could not be detached from 
changes in space and time with which field theory operated.  Einstein stepped back 
into stride with Newton and his cognitive instrument of free invention.  It was free 
in the sense that conclusions were not reached under logical control from fixed 
premises, and it was invented under the pressure of the nature of the universe upon 
the intuitive apprehension of it.  Einstein used Newton and Maxwell’s partial 
differential equations in field theory to develop a mode of rationality called 
mathematical invariance.  Mathematical invariance established a genuine ontology 
in which the subject grips with objective structures and intrinsic intelligibility of 
the universe.9   
This also meant a rejection of Kant’s synthetic a priori whereby knowledge of 
the phenomenal world is said to be reduced to an “order” without actual penetration 
into the Ding an Sich.10  Einstein’s categories are not some form of Kantian a priori 
but conceptions that are freely invented and are to be judged by their usefulness, 
                                                 
6 Valla served in conjunction with Andrea Alciati (1492-1550) as Calvin’s primary influence 
for his biblical interpretation. 
7 Torrance, “Einstein,” 237. 
8 Ibid., 240. 
9 Ibid., 241-242. 
10 Morrison, 90. 
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their ability to advance the intelligibility of the world, which is dependent of the 
observer.  As he sees it, the difference between his own thinking and Kant’s is on 
just this point:  Einstein understands the categories as free inventions rather than 
as unalterable (conditioned by the nature of the understanding).11  It is by this 
method that one can penetrate the inner rationality of the reality by discovery, 
imagination, and insight in order to construct forms of thought and knowledge 
through which the rationality of the object may be discerned.12  Einstein’s free 
invention is quite synonymous with discovery in the sense that the consequent 
conclusion (knowledge) is not inferred or entailed from a fixed categorical 
antecedent (i.e. Kant). 
Principles of method are closely related to empirical observations.  As 
Einstein put it, “the scientist has to worm these general principles out of nature by 
perceiving in comprehensive complexes of empirical facts certain general features 
which permit of precise formulation.”13  These principles, not “isolated general laws 
abstracted from experience” or “separate results from empirical research,” provide 
the basis of deductive reasoning.14 
 
WHAT ABOUT A PRIORI AND NON-EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE? 
 
The onto-relationships as described above concerning the intricate web and 
connection between reality and its entailment of knowledge does not seem to have 
such effect on a priori and non-empirical knowledge.15  Such methodology inevitably 
turns all such knowledge into scientific knowledge—so what about ethical and 
religious knowledge?16  Kant argued that such synthetic a priori knowledge was 
logically prior to any a posteriori knowledge.  Such knowledge would be excluded 
from inferential knowledge but not necessarily excluded form the onto-relationship 
with reality.  This knowledge may serve as an intuitive apprehension into the 
actual intrinsic relations in reality (physical and metaphysical).  This intuitive 
knowledge is rational but non-logical and non-inferential.  This could be said that it 
                                                 
11 Donna Teevan, “Albert Einstein and Bernard Lonergan on Empirical Method,” Zygon 37 
no. 4 (2002): 875-876. 
12 Morrison, 105. 
13 Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Trans. and rev. Sonja Bargmann (New York: Three 
Rivers, 1982), 221. 
14 Teevan, 877. 
15 To claim that such inferential reasons are not good reasons for belief one might deny the 
legitimacy of such forms of abductive reasoning as described above. The most common objection to 
such reasoning is when the conclusion of the argument involves unobservables (physically or 
metaphysically).  Stephen Leeds, “Correspondence Truth and Scientific Realism,” Synthese 159 
(2007): 3.  Bas van Fraassen takes the stronger objection to this inferential reasoning no matter 
what the context is; even if it is empirical a posteriori.  For more on addressing van Fraassen’s 
objection see Igor Douven’s “Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): 
S424-S435. 
16 For the role of moral knowledge in non-inferential reasoning see Bart Streumer, 
“Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 
4-5. 
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is the knowledge that serves as the foundations, which arise in the mind’s assent 
under the impress of objective structures in reality.17  There is no reason to limit 
such intuitive apprehension of reality to the physical world only, which would serve 
as a defeater for any further entailments for positivism or strict empiricism.  Such 
structures of reality may be purely metaphysical such as minds, abstract objects, or 
God.  However, there must be some type of causal capacity for the onto-relations to 
have effect, which would exclude abstract objects since they do not seem to stand in 
causal relations.  Thus, minds and God may serve as plausible ontological origins 
for non-empirical knowledge. 
This methodology is not so far astray from the epistemological realist’s 
empiricism, such a methodology I have assumed thus far, since the onto-
relationship has still been preserved.  This form of method has replaced a posteriori 
knowledge with a priori but the apprehension of such knowledge is still preserved 
by the onto-relationship of reality.  Moral intuition may serve as an a priori 
conception, which can be expressed either doxastically or in a self-evident or 
incorrigible way.  I do not see any good reason for why moral judgments should not 
function as evidence for a belief.  These judgments are not empirically based but 
intuitively based.  These intuitions are objective and are grounded in an objective 
reality, just as is any other criterion for evidence by empirical standards.  The only 
differentiation between moral intuitions and empirical judgments is whether they 
are a priori or a posteriori but are still harmonious with epistemological realism and 
the onto-relationship between reality and knowledge.  This causal relationship may 
simply be impressed upon us logically prior to our experience.18 
 
INFERENTIAL JUSTIFICATION IN FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM 
 
Logically prior to such inferential reasoning is intuition for reasons 
previously discussed.  These intuitions may be basic beliefs. The belief that this 
glass of water in front of me will quench my thirst if I drink it is not inferred back 
from previous experiences coupled with an application of a synthetic a priori 
principle of induction.  Though this example is not how we form our beliefs 
psychologically or historically, it can be formed via instances of past experience and 
induction in the logical sense.  However, when it does come to inferential reasoning 
R.A. Fumerton provides two definitions for what it means to say that one has 
inferential justification.19 
 
D1 S has an inferentially justified belief in P on the basis of E. = Df. 
                                                 
17 Morrison, 91. 
18 If the epistemological realist’s need for empiricism must be appeased by some experiential 
medium then it may certainly follow that the knowledge of certain ethical and religious truths may 
certainly come about a posteriori as well, though this is not the typical approach or ‘category’ for 
such knowledge. 
19 R.A. Fumerton, “Inferential Justification and Empiricism,” The Journal of Philosophy 73 
(1976): 564-65. 
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(1) S believes P. 
(2) S justifiably believes both E and the proposition that E confirms P. 
(3) S believes P because he believes both E and the proposition that E 
confirms P. 
(4) There is no proposition X such that S is justified in believing X and 
that E&X does not confirm P. 
D2 S has an inferentially justified belief in P on the basis of E. = Df. 
(1) S believes P. 
(2) E confirms P. 
(3) The fact that E causes S to believe P. 
(4) There is no proposition X such that S is justified in believing X and 
that E&X does not confirm P. 
 
Given the explications of such definitions, both D1 and D2, there seems to be good 
grounds for believing that P must be inferentially justified.  It is most certainly that 
case that D2 is more amenable to having scientific knowledge in the sense that both 
(2) and (3) are confirmatory.  D2-(3) is certainly difficult to substantiate without 
begging the question.  Having E cause S to believe P is difficult to distance from 
some form of transitive relation.  Inferential justification may also be expressed 
probabilistically or determined probabilistically.20 
I have little contention with such definitions of inferential justification; my concern 
is whether this is most amicable within a foundationalist’s or coherentist’s noetic 
structure. 
Both D1 and D2 offer, I believe, to be successful accounts of inferential 
justification.  However, I do find both definitions to be problematic for the empiricist 
on the bases of foundationalism, of which I will argue that such inferential 
justification and non-epistemological direct realism is more amicable to the 
coherentist and that a non-epistemological realist who adheres to foundationalism 
cannot successfully account for new beliefs. 
Such inferential justification is certainly compatible with foundationalism 
but making all empirical claims to be inferential seems to be over-committing to 
inferential reasoning.  Suppose I am walking in the field and on the next hill over I 
see an object.  For all purposes, my phenomenological faculties indicate to me that 
there is something on the next hill.  This belief is held for a reason, primarily that 
my phenomenological faculties inform me that something is on the next hill over, 
but this is not a reasoned belief.  I may certainly infer certain properties consistent 
                                                 
20 This may be expressed by Thomas Bayes’ theorem for conditional probability: 
p(H | E) = p(H )× p(E | H )
p(E)
 or by his rule for belief change: PE(H) = p(H|E).  If my belief p is going to 
be justified probabilistically then it must be 0 < p ≤ 1 where p is > .5.  Suppose that after all the 
evidence that is available is possessed and I have come to a value of precisely .5 for p.  If I reject p as 
being true then I have just as much of a chance of being wrong about that as I do as being right.  
When p has a value of .5, all things considered, then I believe it would be acceptable to be believe p, 
~p, or to be agnostic.  For more on the role of probability in inferential reasoning see Igor Douven’s 
“Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent.” 
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with D1 and D2 such as the belief that the object has a particular color or that it 
omits a certain sound or that it has a particular smell.  My belief that an object is 
on the next hill over from me seems to be quite basic.  I am not inferring its 
existence from other object-likenesses.  I am completely unaware as to the identity 
of this object, or better yet, whether this object is unique or unknown.  Suppose that 
this object has never been known before I experienced it.  This makes the situation 
quite different from Fumerton’s glass of water and is not a future tensed proposition 
nor is it a subjunctive conditional. 
Inferential reasoning as described by D1 and D2 are certainly kind to 
empiricism when it comes to scientific knowledge.  Certain unknown entities may 
become known by inferential means.  We can infer the existence of protons, quarks, 
and other elementary particles by predicting what effects such entities may have in 
certain situations.  This may be causal in nature and may be confirmed by 
inference. However, it is not the case that we directly experience the existence of 
these particles (for all intents and purposes, it certainly is the case that we 
experience particles when we run in to a wall and even then we experience the 
strong nuclear force over the particles). Nevertheless, epistemological direct realism 
and new belief formation can be non-inferentially justified.21 
With such a methodology for inferential reasoning it may be argued that the 
foundationalist framework requires a presupposing of coherentism.  This would 
bring inference to the best explanation into close contact with the holistic view of 
explanation.22  Philip Kitcher argued that this holistic view of inferential reasoning: 
 
[holds] that [scientific] understanding increases as we decrease the number of 
independent assumptions that are required to explain what goes on in the 
world… Explanations serve to organize and systematize our knowledge in the 
most efficient and coherent possible fashion.  Understanding, on this view, 
involves having a world-picture—a scientific Weltanschauung—and seeing 
how various aspects of the world and our experience of it fit into that 
picture.23 
 
Inferentially justified empirical beliefs are more in sync with a coherentist noetic 
structure.  When making inferential claims the proposition being inferred from 
must cohere to a proposition already accepted as truth.  Inferential reasoning is not 
necessarily non-foundational, but if empirical claims are strictly inferential then 
coherentism is best suited.  No matter what the belief in question is to be it must be 
                                                 
21 This is not to ignore other experiential data such as spiritual or religious experience.  
Other propositional beliefs may be basic but non-empirical such as mathematical truths.  My concern 
is oriented towards empirical basic beliefs.  Additionally, suppose that today is Friday.  I cannot 
change my belief to believe that it is now Sunday or Monday.  Some beliefs are non-inferentially 
justified and involuntary. Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), 25. 
22 Philip Clayton, “Inference to the Best Explanation,” Zygon 32 no. 3 (1997): 387. 
23 Philip Kitcher, “Scientific Explanation,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 
(1989): 182. 
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inferentially referred back to another experientially valid belief (within the scope of 
empirical discussion). 
David Hume brought to our attention a problem with inferential reasoning, 
which is especially important to the present task given his empiricism. 
 
[As] to past experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain 
information of those precise objects only and that precise period of time which 
fell under it cognizance.  But why this experience should be extended to 
future times, and to other objects, which for all we know, may be similar in 
appearance…This, I must confess, seems to be the same difficulty…The 
question still recurs: on what process of argument this inference is founded?  
Where is the medium, the interposing ideas which join propositions so very 
wide of each other?24 
 
Hume is right, it does not follow.  There are plenty of possible worlds that match the 
actual world up to the present time, but then diverge wildly, so that inductive 
inferences would mostly fail in those other worlds.  It is by no means inevitable that 
inductive reasoning should be successful; its success is one more example of the fit 
between our cognitive faculties and the world.25  The criteria for the best inference 
are simplicity, beauty, and consilience (fit with other favored or established 
hypotheses).26  Inferentially justified new beliefs create less dissonance with 
coherentism than with foundationalism.  What is needed logically prior to the 
acceptance or justification of new belief is an evidence base.  This is the set of beliefs 
used, or appealed to, in conducting an inquiry.27  Recall Torrance’s onto-relations.  
This onto-relation allows for inference to be a bridge between the ontological-
epistemological divide.  It is the onto-relationship that serves as Hume’s missing 
medium.  It is this “web” of onto-relations and consilience that function best with 
coherentism.  Thus, to think rightly and in terms of inference and a posteriori 
reasoning means to connect things up with other things, thinking their constituent 
interrelations, and thus it is important for thinking to determine what kind of 
relation that exists between the realities contemplated.28 
 
EXCURSUS: CONSIDERING VAN FRAASSEN’S CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM 
 
Constructive empiricism (CE), primarily developed by Bas van Fraassen, 
regards theoretical identities rather than realistically. CE allows an empiricist 
                                                 
24 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect. IV, 2, in Philosophical 
Inquiry Eds. Jonathan E. Adler and Catherine Z. Elgin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007), 181-82. 
25 Plantinga, 295, 297. 
26 These criteria may certainly be unnecessary in the case of paradigm shift with warranted 
evidence (preservation of consilience).  Additionally, beauty and simplicity are certainly preferred 
but as long as the inference is in relation to reality then these two criterions may be inapplicable.  
Consilience is the most important criterion. 
27 Plantinga, 167. 
28 Morrison, 107. 
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approach to science without requiring the language and formulation of theory that 
the positivist uses.  When one affirms accepts CE one must believe what the theory 
says about observables, that is, one must believe that the theory is empirically 
adequate; but one does not have to believe the whole theory, including what it says 
about unobservables.  Van Fraassen argues that science can be understood without 
the strong realist approach.  Science’s aim becomes set on empirical adequacy 
rather than the full-blown truth.29 
Van Fraassen defines an ‘observable’ as: 
 
X is observable if there are circumstances such that, if X is present to us 
under those circumstances then we observe it.30 
 
That which serves as an observation is not necessarily in the scope of philosophy.  
The limits of observation are a subject for empirical science, and not for 
philosophical analysis.31 Thus, a theory is empirically adequate if and only if what it 
says about the observable things and events in this world is true. 
Empiricism set limits on what one is rationally obligated to believe.  Van 
Fraassen makes the distinction between acceptance and belief.  There is no 
commitment, under CE, to believe the truth of the theory but one can accept the 
empirical data.  This is very modest in its commitment to the informative power of a 
theory.  If one chooses an informative theory over a less committal counterpart then 
it can only be for pragmatic reasons and not because these theories are more likely 
to be true.  According to CE, scientists need never accept the need to postpone 
theories [due to the need of more evidence] or use inferential methods such as 
abduction as forcing them to go beyond the limits of observation.32 This certainly 
seems to have an attraction over realism since CE never goes beyond the evidence 
akin to deduction (though completely different).  However, this can have weak 
explanatory power in that explanations can never go beyond the data.  It’s twofold. 
On the one hand CE is very modest in its claims and keeps explanations within the 
scope of the immediate evidence while on the other hand the explanation of the data 
can never have a legitimate inference to the best explanation outside of the 
evidence.  This is why van Fraassen has always been in opposition to abduction.  If 
positing the real existence of electrons would explain some observable phenomenon, 
this is not in itself a reason to take the step of believe that the unobservable 
electrons exist.  The CE proponent would simply respond to this and say that one 
may rationally stick to the more modest position that all observable phenomena are 
as they would be if the electron theory were true.33 
                                                 
29 Jennifer Nagel, “Empiricism,” in The Philosophy of Science, eds. Sahorta Sarkar and 
Jessica Pfeifer (New York: Routledge, 2006), 240. 
30 Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 16. 
31 Ibid., 56. 
32 Nagel, 240. 
33 Ibid. 
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I certainly see scientific and epistemic benefits to realism while anti-realism 
and CE fall short of acceptance.  Theories are often claimed to have suffered the 
death by a thousand objections.  This obviously does not entail the defeat of the 
theory or explanation it just means this theory must be defended.  However, CE and 
anti-realism really may suffer the deaths by a thousand cuts.  Let this be analogous 
to the problem of reduction.  Reduction requires that the laws of the reduced theory 
be derived from that of the reducing theory.  If explanation is a form of derivation, 
then the reduction of one theory to another explains the reduced theory; in effect it 
shows that the axioms of the less basic theory are theorems of the more basic one.34  
Realism proficiently accounts for reductionism while CE and anti-realism suffer the 
progressive epistemic aspect of science.  Prior to the development of the advanced 
microscopic imaging of an early microscope cells were not even posited as have a 
role in medicine and biology.  The ancient medical advisor to Caesar named Galen 
thought that the only elements to life and health were a balance of the four 
humours. During the mid 1800’s the living cell was thought to be very simplistic 
and there were very few components to the cell.  Contemporary biology has moved 
on from an understanding of the humours being composed of the cells, which were 
once unobserved, and the cells are now composed of smaller mechanisms, which are 
composed of proteins, which were once unobserved as well.  These proteins are 
composed of amino acid folds, which were once unobserved.35  These amino acids are 
composed of molecular bonds and these molecules are composed of elementary 
elements such as carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. There has been a progressive 
reduction of axioms in scientific explanations, which were once considered useful 
fictions but have now been observed as having a real ontic status.  Realism allows 
for reductionism.  Whenever future advances of science allow for the observation of 
current unobservable realism has been reaffirmed while CE and anti-realism suffer 
scientific blows. 
The primary difference between realism, CE, and anti-realism is where these 
approaches rest on the spectrum of ontology and explanation.  Realism takes 
theoretical commitments of science to be real, and not just [disguised] abbreviations 
for observational claims, or useful fictions we create to organize observations.36  
Anti-realism is contrary to realism.  Instead of ‘X is an unobservable and X is real’, 
a la realism, anti-realism purports, ‘X is an unobservable and X is non-real.’  Both 
schools will recognize that, yes, X is an unobservable but the disagree on the ontic 
category.  The category of ontology becomes muddled, if not superfluous, when 
referring to unobservable entities.  An electron is a useful fiction.  Thus, whatever 
X, if X is commonly referred to what is considered to be an electron, then X is a 
useful fiction for understanding the consequent state of affairs.  CE rests in between 
these two ideas.  As previously noted, CE makes no commitment to the ontic status 
of the unobservable and can sway the ontic pendulum either way.  Because CE 
                                                 
34 Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science (New York: Routledge, 2012), 137. 
35 Protein folds may be observed via an electron microscope.  (If ‘electron’ has any real 
meaning here). 
36 Rosenberg, 150. 
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takes the middle ground here that certainly allows for it to be modest in the ontic 
category but because of this modesty I believe it suffers a stunt in explanatory 
power and a less-than-robust conclusion it may offer.  The realist and anti-realist 
thoughts suffer the converse.  The ontic pendulum swings in favor of them make 
clear demarcations in ontology where CE does not and offers explanations that may 
go beyond the evidence.  The empirical positivists would have sided with the anti-
realists for the sake of convenience and consistency.  Because certain evidences are 
unobservable there cannot be any epistemic commitment to the data or conclusions 
from the data because it is unobservable.  However, the positivist can still be a CE 
because the demarcation of ontology is muddled and the explanation stays within 
the data. 
CE makes no prima facie contribution to counterfactual claims.  However, if 
the role of counterfactuals in scientific theory is a desirable then CE is perfectly 
consistent with modal claims.  Unlike the regularist and necessitarian approaches 
to natural laws and scientific explanations CE can go either way concerning the role 
of counterfactuals in a theory.  Realism certainly seems to account for 
counterfactual claims but anti-realism seems to be moot on counterfactuals (though 
one could still be a consistent modal anti-realist).  According to van Fraassen, the 
law of excluded middle does not apply to counterfactual claims—they are neither 
objectively true nor objectively false.37 
The most direct way to defeat CE would be to identify a properly epistemic, 
opposed to merely pragmatic, reason to believe in the claims that science makes 
about entities that lie below the threshold of observation.38  This would include the 
rationality of abduction.  Abduction allows for a powerful predictive capability.  
Abductive reasoning allows for the positing of the best explanation, which may lie 
beyond, external to, the data.  The conclusion does not rest in any of the premises.  
CE doesn’t have a robust ability to predict.  Prediction in a CE model merely 
reiterates the present data and this prediction would make no claim as to what the 
ontic status of the claim actually is.  The realist, for instance, would need to 
establish not just that belief in quarks is rationally permissible but that it is 
rationally required.39  Additionally, CE’s epistemology does not allow for any 
knowledge concerning normative statements.  All a posteriori claims inevitably 
become scientific unless the CE proponent alters their scientific knowledge to an 
arbitrary non-empirical knowledge.40 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 13. Bradley Monton, “Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism,” British 
Journal of the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003): 409.  
38 Nagel, 241. 
39 CE models permit the belief in unobservables as rationally permissible but not rationally 
required. 
40 This is required since abduction is dismissed and, thus, the CE proponents is left only with 
the empirical data and cannot go beyond the data whereas a realist and anti-realist can. 
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There is a long historical development of onto-relations and inferential 
reasoning with primary influence by the contemporary science of the twentieth 
century and philosophers.  Inferential reasoning is a widely practiced methodology 
in the contemporary spheres of science, the philosophy of religion, and the 
philosophy of science.  Bas van Fraassen, as an antirealist, is one of the leading 
opponents of such inferential reasoning and its use of the probability calculus.  
Despite Alvin Plantinga’s reliabilism he has made recent contributions to the onto-
relations and scientific knowledge.41  As Robert Audi put it, the contemporary task 
is discerning whether inferential and scientific knowledge is best suited for 
foundationalism or coherentism.42 
This a posteriori methodology inevitably turns all such knowledge into 
scientific knowledge.  Despite all a posteriori knowledge being scientific in nature 
the onto-relations are preserved in a priori non-empirical knowledge.  Intuitions 
and basic beliefs may serve as antecedents for further inductive reasoning from 
which to use as the evidence base for the “web” of consilience and onto-relations.43  
Such methodological and inferential reasoning is not necessarily restricted to 
foundationalism, as Fumerton had argued since there are legitimate onto-relational 
basic beliefs.  If these onto-relational beliefs serve as antecedents from which 
further inductive or abductive reasoning is used then inferential reasoning becomes 
better understood when it is justified by other doxastic elements in the onto-
relational “web”. 
                                                 
41 Plantinga’s reliabilism would serve as an antecedent to scientific knowledge just like 
foundationalism would as previously discussed.  However, it is difficult to separate the external 
element from the internalist nature of the task. 
42 Robert Audi, Epistemology ed. 3, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 300-1. 
43 This goes to show that one belief would require the logically antecedent justification of one 
or more other beliefs.  This raises the problem of regress but if a basic belief serves as the unjustified 
justifier for that belief then it may be a justified antecedent.  Lawrence Bonjour, “The Coherence 
Theory of Empirical Knowledge,” in Paul Moser, Empirical Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1986), 117. 
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